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The book 'Capital in the Twenty-First Century' by the French economist Piketty about the inequality of 
income and wealth distribution is already quite a while in the spotlights. Throughout his book he uses 
two formulas which he has named ‘the first fundamental law of capitalism’ and ‘the second 
fundamental law of capitalism’. With his reasoning he tries to show that, with these laws in place, he 
is capable to explain inequality phenomena with respect to the income and wealth distribution. 
Without going into the significance of his reasoning and conclusions, we will show that the use of the 
laws, the way he does, is fundamentally wrong. We suggest alternative formulas and a new approach. 
The inequality 𝑟 >  𝑔 is in our opinion not a meaningful equation with respect to inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
The book 'Capital in the Twenty-First Century' by the French economist Piketty (2013) about the 
inequality of income and wealth distribution is already quite a while in the spotlights. Let me start by 
saying that his work is impressive with regard to the years of hard work to collect and structure these 
historical data. He conveniently responds to the sentiment with the words inequality (Stiglitz, 2012) 
and Capitalism (Marx), but he is forgiven for that. Throughout his book he uses two formulas which 
he has named ‘the first fundamental law of capitalism’ and ‘the second fundamental law of 
capitalism’. With his reasoning he tries to show that, with these laws in place, he is capable to explain 
phenomena, that are occurring and have occurred in the economy and are in his well-documented 
archive, with respect to the income and wealth distribution. As an example I mention the return of 
capital, ‘capital is back’, and therefore there is a fair chance that inequality will increase. But here's the 
rub. I do not deny the phenomena as collected by Piketty and I assume that the facts are as observed. 
Without going into the significance of his conclusions, we will show you that the use of the laws and 
his reasoning, the way he does, is fundamentally wrong.  
First we will show the problem with the two fundamental law introduced by Piketty. 
 
Then we derive formulas for the capital to income ratio of a national economy for which we will 
discriminate between the different kinds of capital and derive formulas for each ratio separate, trying 
to make the relevant parameter choices visible. We will argue that there is no special role for 
demographic growth, compared to per capita growth, for the comeback, if at all, of capital (the ratio).  
 
Piketty’s statement, if the rate of return on capital r is greater than the growth of the economy, 𝑟 > 𝑔, 
this will imply a high chance for inequality to occur and eventually that the economy or more specific 
capitalism is in trouble, does not hold. We will argue that the return on capital has little to nothing to 
do with the growth rate of the economy from a fundamental point of view, though it can pave the way 
to make a choice for a higher or lower investment rate, increasing or decreasing the capital to income 
ratio. 
 
We will show that there is no logical theoretical reason that a high capital to income ratio on national 
or private level implies a higher chance on inequality. The other way around there is possibility that 
inequality can harm the economy in the sense the GDP will be lower than desired.  
 
Analyses 
The first law gives the relationship between the capital portion α of income Y, the return 𝑟 on capital 𝐾 
and capital-income ratio 𝛽,  
                           𝛼 =  𝑟𝛽      (1) 
with 𝛽 =  
𝐾
𝑌
 
The definition of capital is not the same everywhere. If 𝛼 is the gross return, expressed in income, then 
𝑟 is the gross return rate on capital 𝐾, expressed in 𝐾. I prefer to use capital of firms here, but in 
principle you may express it in every quantity you like. It is also used as wealth for a private 
individual, in this case including his financial wealth. The trouble arise as soon as you will couple 
capital to income generating power as is done in a production function, then you better limit yourself 
to the factors of production over which entrepreneurs can decide and with which they generate  gross 
return on capital, i.e. 𝐾𝐹. 
3 
 
For now I will use capital as in the total of real equipment, infrastructure, etc., but I will generalize that 
to financial capital as well as soon as that is appropriate.   
This brings us to the second law which says that the ratio between capital and income is determined by 
the net savings rate of income ?̃? divided by the real growth rate 𝑔 of income 𝑌. In the long run  
                                                                       𝛽 =  
𝑠̃
𝑔
      (2) 
That is of course odd. As 𝑔 decreases towards zero than the ratio 𝛽 will keep on increasing at constant 
?̃?. Krusell (2014) already showed that you avoid this behavior if you use, as usual is done in a simple 
growth model, the gross savings rate s. Then the capital-income ratio is  
                                                   𝛽 =  
𝑠
(𝑔 + 𝛿)
      (3) 
where 𝛿 is the depreciation ratio of capital.  
So it seems that one ratio can be infinite and with the other formula calculated is limited. You will 
probably be surprised if I tell you that both formulas really are correct. Krusell showed how to derive 
the formula of Piketty and that in itself is also correctly done, but the implicit assumption that the 
natural coupling of depreciation disappears is not realistic. There comes a time when the depreciation 
will exceed the gross savings. With 𝑔 goes to zero the formula is not realistic when you assume ?̃? to be 
constant, for example, but I will come back to that later. 
Piketty says about this formula, and I quote: 
 
This formula, which can be regarded as the second fundamental law of capitalism, reflects an 
obvious but important point: a country that saves a lot and grows slowly will over the long run 
accumulate an enormous stock of capital (relative to its income), which can in turn have a 
significant effect on the social structure and distribution of wealth. 
Let me put it another way: in a quasi-stagnant society, wealth accumulated in the past will 
inevitably acquire disproportionate importance. 
The return to a structurally high capital/income ratio in the twenty-first century, close to the 
levels observed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, can therefore be explained by the 
return to a slow-growth regime. Decreased growth—especially demographic growth—is thus 
responsible for capital’s comeback. 
The basic point is that small variations in the rate of growth can have very large effects on the 
capital/income ratio over the long run. 
 
This reasoning is wrong, because there is more or less assumed that at lower growth 𝑔 the capital-
income ratio 𝛽 continues to increase, as appears from the formula at constant net savings ratio ?̃?. The 
mistake that has been made here is that the growth rate 𝑔 and the saving ratio ?̃? are interlinked for that 
part of K related to companies. This phenomenon which is violated is known as saving paradox, 
known to every economist, although often neglected. As an example I can mention the book 
Debunking Economics of Steve Keen where in Chapter 14 he made the same kind of fundamental 
mistake and also in several of his articles (de la Fonteijne, 2014-1). To eliminate the difference in the 
formulas (2) and (3), use ?̃? = 𝑠 − 𝛿
𝐾
𝑌
 and solve for the ratio 
𝐾
𝑌
. Piketty is aware of these differences too 
(Piketty and Zucman, 2014), but strange enough, he is using this formula anyhow.  
 
Piketty is convinced that only growth can compensate for the difficulty Marx saw in capitalism, and I 
quote: 
 
The dynamic inconsistency that Marx pointed out thus corresponds to a real difficulty, from 
which the only logical exit is structural growth, which is the only way of balancing the process 
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of capital accumulation (to a certain extent). Only permanent growth of productivity and 
population can compensate for the permanent addition of new units of capital, as the law 𝛽= 
𝑠
𝑔
 
makes clear. 
Otherwise, capitalists do indeed dig their own grave: either they tear each other apart in a 
desperate attempt to combat the falling rate of profit (for instance, by waging war over the best 
colonial investments, as Germany and France did in the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911), or 
they force labor to accept a smaller and smaller share of national income, which ultimately 
leads to a proletarian revolution and general expropriation. In any event, capital is undermined 
by its internal contradictions. 
 
But in fact it is just the other way around, if there is no technological growth then there is no need for 
the production factor capital to grow, as we will show. Although it must be said that in a growing 
economy redistributing and sharing seems to be much easier, a changing ratio is not a logical 
consequence of the formula presented, nor is it proven that the capital to income ratio 𝛽 will keep on 
rising and even then it is not clear whether it can be a cause for inequality.  
 
2. Alternative formulas for the capital to income ratio 
In order to make clear the consequence we split fixed capital K into a part capital of firms 𝐾𝐹, a part 
capital of households 𝐾𝐻𝐻 and a part capital of government 𝐾𝐺𝑜𝑣.  
Please take as an example an economy without international transactions, then savings are equal to 
investment. From a macroeconomic point of view the sum of the financial assets equals zero and we 
only have to deal with real property. We suppose that this economy has a desired size mainly 
determined by the technological status quo and is growing. Using eq. (3) we write the ratio for firms to 
be equal to 
 
𝛽𝐹 =
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
=
𝑠𝐹
𝑔+𝛿𝐹
     (4) 
 
where 𝑠𝐹 =
𝑆𝐹
𝑌
 the part of savings 𝑆𝐹 in income 𝑌. The resulting consumption quote is 
 
𝑐 = 1 − 𝑠𝐹 = 1 − (𝛿𝐹 +  𝑔)
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
     (5) 
 
If we also have a growth 𝑛 of the population it is not allowed to leave it out, because the savings used 
for investment is lowering 𝑐, in the same way as growth g. In this case n is included in g. 
 
And, of course, this is in agreement with standard Solow growth models.  
 
For the capital-income ratio of households we also use the gross savings rate formula 
 
𝛽𝐻𝐻 =
𝐾𝐻𝐻
𝑌
=
𝑠𝐻𝐻
𝑔+𝛿𝐻𝐻
     (6) 
 
where 𝑠𝐻𝐻 is to be chosen 0 < 𝑠𝐻𝐻 < 𝑐, because the savings 𝑠𝐻𝐻 is limited to what consumers and 
government can spend on consumption and is reducing that consumption. 
 
The same holds for the capital-income ratio of the government 
 
𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 =
𝐾𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑌
=
𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑔+𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣
     (7) 
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where 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 is to be chosen 0 < 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 < 𝑐
′ = 1 − 𝑠𝐹 − 𝑠𝐻𝐻, because 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 is limited to what consumers 
and government can spend on consumption and is reducing that consumption, resulting in a 
consumption quote 𝑐′′ = 1 − 𝑠𝐹 − 𝑠𝐻𝐻 − 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 . 
In  total this results for the capital-income ratio in 
 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝐹 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 =
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
+
𝐾𝐻𝐻
𝑌
+
𝐾𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑌
=
𝑠𝐹
𝑔+𝛿𝐹
+
𝑠𝐻𝐻
𝑔+𝛿𝐻𝐻
+
𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑔+𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣
   (8) 
 
Taking into account this limitation on savings we see that the trouble with dividing by zero is 
eliminated and the ratios are limited. This means that for a closed economy the national fixed capital 
to income ratio is limited and so is the national wealth to income ratio, which has the same value, 
because net financial assets are zero. 
 
Piketty claims: 
Decreased growth—especially demographic growth—is thus responsible for 
capital’s comeback. 
The basic point is that small variations in the rate of growth can have very large effects on the 
capital/income ratio over the long run. 
 
In our formula we do not see this extreme sensitivity in growth g. Although, we do not deny that due 
to the dynamics on the short and medium term there might be even large effects, which is also caused 
by the very long reaction time of the system dynamics to stabilize. In particular you cannot 
discriminate between demographic growth and technical growth, so there is no specific role for 
demographic growth regarding capital’s comeback.  
 
So far the formulas are independent of the choice of a production function. E.g. if we take a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and 𝛼 the coefficient of the production 
factor 𝐾𝐹 , 𝑔 = 𝑠𝐻𝐻 = 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 = 0 and equilibrium on all markets, then we calculate the boundary values 
for 𝑐 to be 
 
1 − 𝛼 < 𝑐 < 1      (9) 
 
At the boundaries the profit of firms is zero and the maximum profit is at 𝑐 = 1 − 𝛼2. For a more 
detailed explanation and stability analysis see De la Fonteijne (2012). 
Example 1: Let  𝛼 = .3 and the depreciation 𝛿𝐹 = .05 , then at maximum profit 𝑐 = 1 − 𝛼
2 = .91, 
𝑠𝐹 = 𝛼
2 = .09 and the ratio 𝛽𝐹 results in 𝛽𝐹 =
1−𝑐
𝛿𝐹
= 1.8  
If 𝑠𝐹 = .08,  𝑠𝐻𝐻 = 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 = .05,  𝛿𝐻𝐻 = 𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣 = .01 and 𝑔 = .015, then 𝛽𝐹 = 1.23, 𝛽𝐻𝐻 = 𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 =
𝑠𝐻𝐻
𝑔+𝛿𝐻𝐻
= 2.00 and the total ratio is 𝛽𝑡 = 5.23 (see fig. 1 for different values for 𝑠𝐹 and 𝑠𝐻𝐻). 
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Fig. 1 Capital to income ratio as a function of the savings quote 𝑠𝐹 and parameter 𝑠𝐻𝐻, the other values 
the same as in example 1. 
 
You might have the impression that savings quote can be chosen freely, but in case of 𝑠𝐹 we can show 
that it is very likely that 𝑠𝐹 depends on g. E.g. consider again a Cobb-Douglas production function 
then under optimal condition capital 𝐾𝐹 is growing at the same speed as Y, leaving the ratio 
unchanged (de la Fonteijne, 2012). 
From eq. 5 we derive 𝑐1 = 𝑐(𝑔 = 0) = 1 − 𝛿𝐹
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
 which results in 
 
 
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
=
(1−𝑐1)
𝛿𝐹
       (10) 
 
 This means that with eq. 4 
 
 𝑠𝐹 = (𝑔 + 𝛿𝐹)
𝐾𝐹
𝑌
=
(𝑔+𝛿𝐹)
𝛿𝐹
(1 − 𝑐1)    (11) 
 
The total ratio for a closed economy will become 
 
𝛽𝑡 =
(1−𝑐1)
𝛿𝐹
+
𝑠𝐻𝐻
𝑔+𝛿𝐻𝐻
+
𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑔+𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣
           (12) 
 
Example 2: Values for Dutch situation in 2012 are close to 𝑐1 = .015, 𝛿𝐹 = .05, 𝛿𝐻𝐻 = .015,  
𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣 = .03, 𝑠𝐻𝐻 = .07,  𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 = .045 and 𝑔 = .015 then the corresponding 𝑠𝐹 = .12, 𝛽𝐹 = 1.70, 
𝛽𝐻𝐻 = 2.33, 𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 = 1.00 and 𝛽𝑡 = 5.03 (see fig. 2 for different values for 𝑐1 and 𝑠𝐻𝐻). 
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Fig. 2 Capital to income ratio as a function of 𝑔 and parameter 𝑠𝐻𝐻, the other values the same as in 
example 2. 
 
It is plausible that an optimal value for 𝐾𝐺𝑜𝑣  in relation to the economy is equal to a certain part 𝛾 of  
𝐾𝐹. This means that  
𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 =  𝛾𝛽𝐹       (13) 
 and the governmental savings quote 
𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 = 𝛾
(𝑔+𝛿𝐺𝑜𝑣)
𝛿𝐹
(1 − 𝑐1)             (14) 
 
Additionally if the economy is not closed we have to add the ratio of external capital 𝛽𝑓𝑜𝑟 . In The 
Netherlands this is a substantial part, 𝛽𝑓𝑜𝑟 = .87 and for the world it is a zero sum game. 
 
In total the capital to income ratio for an economy will change to 
 
𝛽𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾)
(1−𝑐1)
𝛿𝐹
+
𝑠𝐻𝐻
𝑔+𝛿𝐻𝐻
+ 𝛽𝑓𝑜𝑟                               (15) 
 
 
For an estimate of the private capital-income ratio you can deduct the total governmental capital to 
income ratio from 𝛽𝑡. Financial net capital of the government is 𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣, expressed as a fraction of 
income 𝑌, then  
𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣 =
𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑌
     (16) 
 
 
The final capital for income ratio for the private sector becomes the sum of eq. 15 and eq. 16 
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𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 = 𝛽𝑡 − 𝛽𝐺𝑜𝑣 − 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣    (17) 
 
If 𝑐𝐺𝑜𝑣 is the governmental consumption quote, then the consumers quote will result in  
 
𝑐′′′ =  𝑐 − 𝑠𝐹 − 𝑠𝐻𝐻 − 𝑠𝐺𝑜𝑣 − 𝑐𝐺𝑜𝑣     (18) 
 
Continuing our example 2 with 𝛾 = .59, 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣 =
𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐺𝑜𝑣
𝑌
= −.42 and 𝛽𝑓𝑜𝑟 = .87 we calculate 
𝛽𝑡 =5.90 and 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 = 5.43 
 
For the capital to income ratio for the households we deduct the total capital to income ratio of firms 
from 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣. Financial net capital of companies is 𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹, expressed as a fraction of income 𝑌, then  
 
𝛽𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹 =
𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹
𝑌
       (19) 
 
Be aware that the financial liabilities 𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 of companies in the National Accounts includes equity of 
shares in third parties hands. 
 
     𝐾𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐹 = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦            (20) 
  
The final capital to income ratio for households become 
 
𝛽𝐻𝐻 = 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 − 𝛽𝐹 − 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐹 
     (21) 
In the consumer sector of this economy there will be, of course, additional debt and deposit positions, 
but it will sum up to zero outside the consumers sector. These additional debt and deposit positions 
can of course be an additional source of inequality. Moreover, we assume a financial world, which will 
take care for all necessary financial flows, in a Stock Flow Consistent way and with institution and 
mechanism for lending, borrowing, redistribution, inflation control, debt control, unemployment 
control, etc., in place.  
 
Piketty (2014, fig III) showed the capital to income ratio of the UK from 1700 till 2010. Another way 
of explaining these dramatic changes over time is as follows. In 1700 a large part of 𝐾𝐹 was land with 
depreciation rate equal to zero, allowing the capital to income ratio 𝛽𝐹  to become fairly high. In the 
same picture we see the rest domestic capital to be slightly increasing from 1970 to 2010, meaning that 
(1−𝑐1)
𝛿𝐹
  is slowly increasing. On the other hand housing capital is strongly increasing, which means an 
attitude change towards a higher savings rate 𝑠𝐻𝐻 or a lower growth rate g, which is the main reasons 
for the increase in national wealth, because a dramatic change in 𝛿𝐻𝐻 is not very likely. 
It will also be clear for the same reason that I cannot agree with the following statement of Piketty, and 
I quote: 
 
In any event, it is important to point out that no self-corrective mechanism exists to prevent a 
steady increase of the capital/income ratio, β, together with a steady rise in capital’s share of 
national income, α. 
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Moreover we think that a corresponding decline of r will withhold entrepreneurs to do business 
stopping the increase of the capital/income ratio β . 
 
 
3. Criterion return rate on capital greater than growth rate of economy  
Based on the previous formulas one cannot conclude that there will arise any form of inequality within 
consumers on purely macroeconomic grounds, even if it does happen.  
 
At least you will need to differentiate between subgroups within households.  
 
The following statement by Piketty is an attempt to it, I assume, and I quote: 
 
If, moreover, the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an 
extended period of time (which is more likely when the growth rate is low, though not 
automatic), then the risk of divergence in the distribution of wealth is very high. 
This fundamental inequality, which I will write as 
  
𝑟 >  𝑔        (22) 
 (where r stands for the average annual rate of return on capital, including profits, dividends, 
interest, rents, and other income from capital, expressed as a percentage of its total value, and 
g stands for the rate of growth of the economy, that is, the annual increase in income or 
output), will play a crucial role in this book. In a sense, it sums up the overall logic of my 
conclusions. 
 
In these words I believe to see a Marxian way of thinking, where the capitalists/firms/rich are opposite 
to the workers/poor. I have already shown that it is advisable to clearly distinguish between firms and 
capitalists (de la Fonteijne, 2014-2). Capitalist and worker are then both in the consumer group and 
you have to distinguish at least these two groups to show any kind of inequality. 
  
A second point is that 𝑟 is meant as gross return on total capital, but that does indicate absolutely 
nothing for what is done with this profit. From a monetary point of view nothing can be saved in a 
closed economy, because savings equal investments. A large part of 𝑟 has to be redistributed to the 
economy and has to be spend by the consumer. There can only be savings by making investments. 
This means that in this case 𝑟 >  𝑔 has no meaning in relation to inequality. And precisely this is 
Piketty’s most important point: 
 
In a sense, it sums up the overall logic of my conclusions. 
 
To my opinion this does not sum up to logic at all.   
 
A third point is that 𝑟 is calculated with respect to domestic capital, which is a rather arbitrary choice 
in my opinion. I prefer, as mentioned earlier, to use capital  𝐾𝐹. With 𝛼 = .3, the rate of return on 
capital will rise from 𝑟 = .05 to 𝑟 = .17, because of the change in the capital to income ratio, thus 
losing the connection with the value of 𝑔. If you realize that 𝑐1 and 𝑠𝐻𝐻 can be chosen arbitrary, 
within limits, then it will be clear that the criterion 𝑟 >  𝑔 cannot have a special meaning with regards 
to investment and capital to income ratio. And as a final argument, if 𝑔 = 0 and 𝑟 = .17 there still can 
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exits an economy, but again a growth per capita due to technological progress is much nicer to deal 
with. From the firms point of view we require at least  𝑟𝐹 > 𝛿𝐹 , with 𝑟𝐹 =
𝛼
𝛽𝐹
, to make profit. 
 
A forth point of concern is the definition of return on capital. In order to make the definition more 
general and suitable for all economy sectors, subsectors or individuals it is better to discriminate 
between the capitals of those sectors, e.g. the way we did, and if you do so to subtract for interest, etc. 
paid on liabilities. At some point in his book Piketty is using his equation for individual wealth, 
calculating a net (of spending) rate of return and he is comparing that rate with the growth rate of the 
economy. Also in this case we don’t feel very comfortable, but because the formulation is not precise 
enough we will skip that part. 
 
The inequality 𝑟 >  𝑔 is often used in governmental debt sustainability analyses to show that we are 
not dealing with Ponzi scheme and/or explosive debt levels, with 𝑟 the real interest rate, but in the 
mentioned case, as pointed out, 𝑟 is not a real net growth level. 
 
If we look at the short-term and long-term trend of fig. 5.3 of Piketty then we see a volatile capital-
income ratio in the short run, caused by bubbles and wars, but the long-term trend is upwards. The 
latter may be due to technological progress or another choices for 𝑐1 and 𝑠𝐻𝐻. Once you have eaten 
enough bread, you can choose whether you want to spend an increasing proportion of your income to 
bricks or health care, to name but one example. In the one case the ratio increases and in the other case 
it does not.  
 
4. Savings and capital to income ratio at the individual level 
So far we discussed savings and capital to income ratios at the national, the private, the firms and the 
consumers level. We now will look into the individual level within the consumers group. As an 
opening to an alternative way of thinking I’ll invite you to the following thought experiment. Suppose 
we take two consumers groups, consumer group 𝐶𝐴 has more capital then group 𝐶𝐵 , which differences 
are the result of differences in income, savings, interests, dividends, spending, taxes, etc. It is obvious 
that if one of these groups has a net saving rate ?̃? greater than growth 𝑔 then this group will become 
unsustainable rich. Members of these groups may even switch positions from rich to poor and vice 
versa. It all depends on their behavior and possibilities as a consumer. 
Suppose within consumers we have additional financial capital distribution 𝐾𝐹𝐴𝐴  and  𝐾𝐹𝐴𝐵   for the 
two groups  𝐶𝐴 and  𝐶𝐵  due to savings for pension, mortgages for houses, etc. Let e.g. the interest rate 
be 𝑟𝐶 and the net saving rate ?̃?𝐶𝐴  and ?̃?𝐶𝐵 . 
 
𝐾𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴  
= −𝐾𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐵  
     (23) 
 
𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴
= −𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐵
     (24) 
 
 and  
?̃?𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴
= −?̃?𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐵  
     (25) 
 
which means that there will be no influence on consumption due to these savings. 
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The capital income ratio is 
 
𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴
=
𝑠̃
𝑔
      (26) 
 
The total ratio for consumers 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵  is determined by splitting 𝛽𝐻𝐻 into a part for 𝐶𝐴 and a part for 
𝐶𝐵  and to calculate 
 
𝛽𝑡𝐶𝐴
= 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐴
     (27) 
and 
 
𝛽𝑡𝐶𝐵
= 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐵
+ 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐵
     (28) 
 
The question then is, can the capital to income ratio indeed grow without limit when the growth 𝑔 will 
go to zero, as eq. 18 is suggesting, and how can it, apart from inequality itself, effect the real economy 
and particularly, can it cause unemployment, which is one of the most important things in society to 
avoid.  
 
When a financial asset is created (deposit) then the counterpart is a financial liability (debt).  
Even if we assume that money is created endogenously it is limited due to budget constraints, bank 
requirements and restrictions or downward pressure by means of the interest rate of the central bank. 
Suppose we have, at a certain moment in time, a feasible and sustainable redistribution, then a higher 
interest will eventually limit interest payments due to violations or budget constraints. 
Another way of looking at a growing deposit is to wonder what the debtors did with all that money. 
There are only two ways of spending it. One is to consume, but then the other group have to consume 
less since we assume an optimal size of the economy. This has no effect on the economy as we argued 
before. The other possibility is to buy existing goods, e.g. houses, but then it is limited to the total of 
real assets as calculated in the ratio 𝛽𝑡, because what more can you buy. Even with rapid rising real 
assets prices it is in the end limited, because it has a relation to the rebuilt value. 
Another way of limiting deposits is by restricting debt to the limit where there is a limited risk for not 
meeting the payback obligations including interest and by demanding a down payment when buying a 
house and ensuring that the house itself can serve as a collateral. 
 
An overall more holistic reasoning is that in a certain growing economy the earning power of that 
economy is limited and so are the real assets produced by that economy and that will restrict the 
capital to income of no matter which group in society, because beyond every debt there has to be 
enough  collateral or payback capacity. And in fact that’s all what matters. 
 
We conclude that in all cases the capital to income ratio is limited for fundamental and natural reasons.  
 
We now turn to whether debt can harm the real economy. In most cases there is a severe built up in 
debt before crises and we know that an extreme austerity program is not the most optimal strategy to 
go, because of the negative impact on growth. From the historical data it is also clear that it will take a 
long time to recover from high debt levels.  
 
If an external debt has become too high, then interest rate might go up and may even lead to a vicious 
circle if you need to refinance the interest too, because of a lack of earning power, in which case it is 
easy to understand that it will lead to an unsustainable situation.  
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In case we built more houses in a certain period, for which we need mortgages, then it will take 
normally at least 20 to 30 years to reduce those specific debts, which also illustrates the time dynamics 
of debt. 
 
 
 
Another point Piketty is referring to is the focus on mathematics and models by economist, and I 
quote: 
 
To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion for 
mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at the expense 
of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences. Economists are all too 
often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves. This 
obsession with mathematics is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without 
having to answer the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in. There is one 
great advantage to being an academic economist in France: here, economists are not highly 
respected in the academic and intellectual world or by political and financial elites. Hence they 
must set aside their contempt for other disciplines and their absurd claim to greater scientific 
legitimacy, despite the fact that they know almost nothing about anything. This, in any case, is 
the charm of the discipline and of the social sciences in general: one starts from square one, so 
that there is some hope of making major progress. 
In France, I believe, economists are slightly more interested in persuading historians and 
sociologists, as well as people outside the academic world, that what they are doing is 
interesting (although they are not always successful). 
 
Also Keen in his book, ‘Debunking Economics’ has a similar remark. To put it into perspective, let’s 
not focus only on historical data, because there is a lack in theory, in order to model only what has 
been. We are convinced that the theoretical part of our understanding of economy can be improved a 
lot. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We cannot agree with Piketty’s first and second law of capitalism and present alternative formulas. 
We did not find such a strong impact from the growth of the economy to the capital to income ratio.  
 
The capital to income ratio on a national or private sector base does depend on a more or less free 
choice, within limits, of the consumption quote at zero growth and the savings quote of households. 
The ratio also depends on the depreciation rates and economy growth. 
 
We found the capital to income ratio to be limited in all cases by the earning power of the economy. A 
direct effect is, that in the end, there does not exit such a thing as diminishing return on investment due 
to extreme growing of capital. We like to point out that we prefer to restrict the term return on 
investment with respect to capital used as a factor of production, on the national, the private sector and 
firm level.  
 
As soon as we also deal with financial assets and liabilities then we have to take inflation into account 
too, to calculate the long term capital to income ratio. In this paper we did not do so. 
 
Piketty’s book contains a lot of interesting data, which we did not evaluate nor criticize because it 
would be beyond the scope of this paper and beyond our ability.   
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The inequality 𝑟 >  𝑔 is in our opinion not a meaningful equation with respect to inequality. 
 
6. Acknowledgement 
This paper is part of a study to reduce unemployment in a sustainable way whilst keeping 
governmental debt within sustainable limits and improve prosperity. In our opinion this is one of the 
most important things to achieve in society from a macro economic and from a participation society 
point of view. We are convinced we can provide a feasible solution to this problem as part of a 
sustainable society. 
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